the relevant data, wheat consumption in anyone year was estimated with the following formulation: Table 1 Wheat Production. Wheat Consumption and Degree *of Wheat
Self-Sufficiency in Pakistan for Selected Years
It is clear from Table 1 that Pakistan enjoyed varying degrees of self-sufficiency in wheat in various years of the period under consideration. From 1949-50 to 1954-55, Pakistan remained wheat-surplus as is evidenced by the fact that during that period it imported very little wheat, perhaps mainly for reserve. Pakistan's self-sufficiency in wheat was considerably weakened between 1954-55 and 1964-65: domestic wheat output accounted for only 82.71 percent and 73.30 percent, respectively, of the total wheat consumption requirements in 1959-60 and 1964-65 . The bumper wheat harvest of 1967-68, thanks to the Green Revolution, led to a drastic reductionin wheatimports-from 1.44milliontons in 1967-68to only 16,000tons in 1968-69 [20, p. 248] . Although this new development promoted official [21, p. 261] , [26, p. 4] and unofficial [10, p. 331 ] optimism for Pakistan's entry into wheat exports, the self-sufficiency status achieved in 1968-69 was short-lived as dependence on imports began to grow again: in 1974-75, more than 14 percent of Pakistan's wheat requirements were met by imports. Although dependence on imports from 1975-76 to 1977-76 was somewhat lower, wheat imports reached a record figure of 2.24 million tonnes worth Rs. 3.5 billion in 1978-79. In the subsequent years, Pakistan's wheat production exceeded wheat consumption and resulted in wheat exports and accumulation of wheat stocks [14, p. 66] .
Although, for want of data, it is not possible to identify all the factors that helped Pakistan to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat in and about 1950, it is interesting to compare the mechanics of the self-sufficiencyin wheat in the late Sixties with that in the early Eighties. Firstly, the self-sufficiency in the Eighties was accompanied by critical shortages of edible oils and pulses which, of course, were not present in 1968-69. This situation was caused by the then exclusive emphasis of the government policy on wheat. Secondly, the self-sufficiency in 1968-69 was achieved by a sharp increase in wheat output and was accompanied by rapid increase in wheat consumption. By contrast, the early Eighties were characterised by modest output increases and stagnating wheat consumption. This implies that at the current population growth rate of 3.0 percent per annum, self-sufficiency in wheat, wheat exports and build-up of buffer stocks in the Eighties were largely the result of falling per capita wheat consumption. On the basis of the available empirical evidence for the period under consideration, it is possible to conclude that while the per capita wheat consumption in the Sixties increased at the rate of 3.5 -10,7 percent per annum, that in the Eighties actually fell at the rate of 1.2 -4.3 percentper annum [5, p. 13] . In view ofthe continuous rise in per capita incomes and the insignificant substitution of other foodgrains and animal products for wheat, the fall in the per capita wheat consumption appears to be paradoxical, but strict government control of the wheat market, through its monopoly of procurement, and a tight wheat-stock release policy may well be responsible for this fall.
where Ct refers to actual wheat consumption during any year "t", Wt-1 equals wheat output for the year preceding "t" , (Mt -Xt) represents wheat imports net of exports during the year "t" , and (Dt -At) is the dep~etionof or addition to government wheat stocks.
Based on the above formulation, Table I 
III. PROSPECTS OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Pakistan appears to have become self-sufficient in wheat in recent years. As reflected by the data in Table 1 , the growth of wheat production between 1949-50 and 1982-83 has slightly been in excess of the growth of wheat consumption. Assuming that this long-term trend could be maintained, prospects of maintaining self-sufficiency in wheat in the future appear to be good. These prospects will be considerably brightened if the government will continue its policy of restricting wheat consumption. But, then, an indefinite continuation of such a policy may be neither possible nor desirable, for, by restricting wheat consumption, the government would create a large unsatisfied demand for wheat, which, apart from clashing with the objective of attaining self-sufficiency in wheat, will raise wheat prices, thereby causing inflation, and create political unrest in the country, especially because rising incomes will tend to further raise the consumers' demand for wheat as a staple food.
On a priori grounds, changes in the growth of consumption of a staple food commodity like wheat may be taken to be the function of changes in the commodity's own price relative to the prices of its close substitutes, rate of growth of population, trend of income distribution, growth of per capita income and the grain's amount required for seed and feed [10, p. 323, and 26, p. 3] . Although population growth rate, income distribution and seed requirements are unlikely to change significantly, wheat consumption growth rates may well be considerably higher in the future than those in the past owing to changes in other factors.
For example, against the long-term realized growth rate of 2.16 percent, the target of the Sixth Five-YearPlan is an annual growth of 3.5 percent in per capita income. At the prevailing 0.5-percent income elasticity of demand for wheat, the annual growth rate of wheat consumption is likely to accelerate from 1.08 percent to 1.75 percent for this factor alone. Also, there is an increasing possibility of greater substitution of wheat for other food grains because of the stagnating production, and the consequently reduced availability and higher prices of the other food grains. At the present level of Pakistan's development, the importance of consumption and production of livestock products is likely to rise and create a greater demand for wheat as feed for livestock [12, p. 242, and 26, p. 3] . Also important in this respect is Pakistan's objective of generating significant wheat surpluses for export in the near future.
From the foregoing, it is not difficult to see that wheat consumption in the future will increase at the rate of well above 5.0 percent per annum and that wheat production will have to grow at precisely the same rate to permit a sustainable selfreliance. The question then arises whether it would be possible for Pakistan to realize a yearly growth rate of wheat output exceeding 5.0 percent in the future.
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If we look at Pakistan's past performance in wheat production, we find that during the 33-year period under consideration, wheat output grew at an annual rate of only 3.35 percent. If, on the basis of this long-run growth rate, one were to assess Pakistan's prospects of achieving the target growth rate of over 5 percent, one would find them rather dim. But, then, it is also a fact that during the IS-year period between i964-65 and 1979-80, Pakistan had achieved a wheat-output growth rate of 6.0 percent per annum, thanks essentially to the cultivation of high-yieldingvarieties (HYVs) of wheat. It is thus manifest that if Pakistan wishes to achieve a wheatoutput growth rate of more than 5 percent per annum, it should intensify the cultivation of HYVs of wheat. An expansion of the area devoted to wheat in the country would be of additional help in this regard.
Is it profitable to expand the wheat area in Pakistan? Under the present conditions, No; for wheat prices are lower than those of other food grains. To induce farmers to bring additional area under wheat cultivation, it will be necessaryto maintain higher wheat prices relative to the prices of other crops. Even if this is done, it may not turn out to be such a wonderful solution, for it may have adverse effects on the national economy. For example, it may (i) result in a shrinking of the area under other crops, leading to their shortages, (ii) somewhat reduce the already unsatisfactory food consumption of the low-incomegroups, (iii) exacerbate income inequalities by causing the low-income groups to pay more for the wheat purchased from the marketable surpluses of the high-incomegroups, and (iv) reduce Pakistan's ability to compete in the international wheat market [5, p. 27] .
In view of the above limitations, Pakistan must, in the main, depend on exploitation of the unrealized yield potential of the high-yielding varieties of wheat, both existing and to be evolved, and there seems to be a considerable scope for it. For example, it has been argued in a number of studies that the actual wheat yields in Pakistan are only 30-40 percent of the possible yields of the existing HYVs of wheat [9, p. 406; 13, p. 12; and 24, pp. 1-5] . One of the implications of these figures is that wheat output in Pakistan could be more than doubled or trebled by simply tapping the yield potential of the existing varieties. The possibility that new HYVs of wheat may be evolved in the future promises even higher growth rates of wheat output in Pakistan.
The successful exploitation of the as yet unrealized yield potential of the existing HYVs of wheat and the potential to be created in the future is, however, constrained by a number of factors. The studies on yield constraints, referred to above, all agree that low fertilizer-application rates are among the principal causes of low actual wheat yields, with poor water management, low quality seeds, inadequate plant protection measures, prevalence of water-logging and salinity and the continuity of outmoded cultivation practices being the other major causes. It may be reiterated that while the actual fertilizer-application rates are only 35 percent and about 20 percent of the respective recommended rates in irrigated and unirrigated areas [22, p. 30J , the low rates of fertilizer application account for as much as 60 percent of the unrealized wheat-yield potential [24, pp. 1-5J . It follows that the realization of the untapped wheat-yield potential would not be possible without greatly stepped-up use of modern key inputs and practices.
The use of modern inputs and practices may in general be promoted by extension agents, mass media, institutional credit and by increasing their profitability. It may, however, be pointed out that the success of these approaches would in the ultimate analysis, be determined by their demonstrated profitability. It has, for example, been averred that when the price of fertilizer is far above the prices of farm products no extension programme can induce farmers to use additional quantities of fertilizer [23, p. 45J . It has similarly be remarked by Johnston and Connie that application of chemical fertilizers would undoubtedly increase unless there is a marked deterioration of grain-fertilizer price ratios [8, p. 575J. These conclusions also follow from Pakistan's historical experience. It has been claimed that the stagnating wheat output during the Fifties and the early Seventies was respectively the result of the policy of compulsory wheat-procurement at less than world prices and a steep unilateral increase in fertilizer prices without corresponding increases in the price of wheat [3, p. 6, and 4, p. 4J. By contrast, wheat output registered unprecedented growth rates during the Sixties, largely in response to prices which were higher than those in the world market, and low prices of key agricultural inputs. In the second half of the Seventies, the reduction in the price of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs had a similar effect on growth of wheat output.
Since the prices of the major agricultural commodities, including wheat, and the key agricultural inputs have been controlled by the government in Pakistan, the policy towards agriculture is of crucial significance in determining the profitability of agriculture, wheat output and the key agricultural inputs. It is rather sad that the government, since 1979-80, has been pursuing a price policy that has resulted in a progressivedecline of the profitability of wheat output in recent years in relation to key agricultural inputs and most agricultural crops. For example, against the limited increase of only 28 percent in wheat prices, the retail price of a 50-kg bag of urea was increased by 103.2 percent, from Rs. 63.00 in 1979-80 to Rs. 128.00 in 1983-84 [11, p. 1983-84 [11, pp. 14-21 J. Although the price increases in the case of cotton and sugarcane almost equalled those for wheat, paddy, potatoes and onion, procurement prices were increased by 58 percent, 51 percent, and 55 percent, respectively, between 1979-80 and 1983-84 [II, p. From the foregoing, it is unmistakably clear that wheat output under the current agricultural policy is bound to stagnate or, at best, exibit only in:perceptible increases. It may also be pointed out that an indiscriminate use of this policy in the future would ultimately result in Pakistan's loss of self-sufficiencyin wheat, growing dependence on wheat imports and the consequent deteriorating balance of payments. Although it may be too soon to capture the full effect of such a policy, complete stagnation in wheat output between 1980-81 and 1983-84 is a cause for alarm and may in general be attributed to the faltering agricultural policy of the recent years [11, p. 31) . It is needlessto add that self-sufficiencyin wheat on a sustainable basis will remain unattainable unless the present policy is seriously redirected to take opposite course in the future. Whilewhat constitutes future Courseof action is discussed in the next section, it is my earnest hope that the recommendations will be of some value to policy makers for ensuring self-sufficiencyin wheat in the future on a sustainable basis.
IV. CONCLUSIONSAND POLICYRECOMMENDA nONS
The purpose of the present study has primarily been to review the past record of wheat output in the country and to assessPakistan's prospects of becoming selfsufficient in wheat. As for the past record, Pakistan attained self-sufficiency in wheat in 1949-50, 1969-70 and 1979-80 . Had it not been for the forced decline in per capita wheat consumption, the self.sufficiency achieved in 1979-80 would have met the same fate as that in 1949-50 or 1969-70.
The study has concluded that the desired growth rate of demand for wheat is most likely to exceed 5.0 percent per annum in the future. In view of the 3.35 percent annual long-term growth of wheat output, Pakistan has only limited possibilities of retaining self-sufficiency in wheat. Pakistan's prospects of self-sufficiency in wheat in the future are further dimmed by the dismal growth performance of wheat output (1.5 percent per annum) between 1979-80 and 1983.84. This, however,is not to arguethat wheatoutput is unlikely to grow fasterin the future. But quite to the contrary,there seems to be a largeunrealizedwheatyield potential whichcouldbe tapped for rapid increasesin wheatoutput. Thereis only a limited possibility of realizing this untapped potential under the current agricultural policy as it has led to the declining profitability of wheat production and key agricultural inputs. As a consequence, the consumption of most of the key agricultural inputs has been falling in the recent years. There can be no denying the fact that rapid increases in the use of key agricultural inputs can not be increased without stepped-up profitability of wheat production through appropriate changes in government policy towards agriculture. It is in view of this consideration that this paper makes the following four recommendations.
Firstly, the current agricultural price policy which favours high prices for both input and output needs to be replaced with a policy which keeps the prices of inputs and outputs at a low level. It has been argued that when the use of modern inputs is as low as that in Pakistan, a low price policy for inputs is likely to be the most efficient way of developingagriculture [I and 2] . The policy of low prices for inputs and outputs, unlike the current one, has no unintendedadverseeffectson Pakistan's competence in wheat-export market, nutrition of the poor, income distribution and inter-crop balances. In fact, the recommended policy might help the small farmers in the use of modern inputs and the poorer consumers in the improvementof their nutritionby alleviatingthe resourceconstraints.
However, it is generally argued that such a policy might involve huge subsidy bills and may not be desirable. That this is unlikely to be the case has ben argued elsewhere and is discussed below [7, p. 196] .
Obviously the government's claim that agricultural inputs are highly subsidized in Pakistan is based on the differences between import costs and sale prices in the case of fertilizer and between costs and receipts in the case of irrigation water.
Suchcalculations, whilelogical,however,may not reflectthe factsIonthe groundas subsidies mayaccrueto others ratherthan to the agriculturists.For example,in view of Pakistan's self-sufficiency in fertilizer, it is illogical to use import costs for calculation of fertilizer subsidy. While export price would be more relevant in this case, its plain use without adjustment for production losses at home would be equally wrong. One appropriate alternative to the above approaches is the comparison of the production costs of domestically produced fertilizers with sale prices. On the basis of this comparison, it would seem that the government provides no subsidy on fertilizer because the current retail sale price of Rs. 128.00 per 50-kg bag of urea is considerably in excess of the cost of production (Rs. 65-70 per 50-kg bag) of efficiently run domestic fertilizer plants. Whilefarmers pay a much higher price than the costof productionof fertilizer,the differenceis pocketedawayeitherby dealers, or by factory owners or by the government. The same holds in the case of irrigation water. The current surge in recurring expenditure on irrigation water is largely the result of revised national pay-scales, remodelling of canals and canal headworks, construction of dams, flood protection, and water-course improvement programme. While it is not clear whether agriculture should be held responsible for the increase in the recurring expenditure, which is really due to revision of pay-scales,the expendi. ture, associated with the rest of the measures has a long pay-off period in the future and only a small fraction of it should enter into current costs.
Secondly, the present government practice of charging farmers variously for the same amount of canal water suppliedby the kind of cropsgrown and by cropping intensity does not make for economicefficiencyof water use. Thusto think that raising of water charges would lead to greater efficiency of water use is fallacious. Like the allocation of water-supply the assessmentof water charges, too, should be on the basis of the canal-commanded area. As against the disincentive effects of the current intensity related water rates, the recommended measure is likely to promote multiple-cropping both because of economy in water application and because of greater profitability of alternative sources of irrigation water.
Thirdly,in orderto ensurelowpricesfor key agriculturalinputsand commodities, there seemsto be a seriousneed for retrenchmentor withdrawal of manycostly public-sector programmes. For example, the cost of production of governmentoperated fertilizer plants is 2-3 times the cost of production in the private sector [18, p. 7] . The cost of procurementoperationsis quite excessive: in 1980-81,it costs the government as much as Rs. 7.79 billion. In the case of wheat alone, the procurementcost in the same year was in excessof Rs. 4.47 billion [16, p. 84] . It would be appropriate if the government-operated fertilizer plants are transferred to the private sector and the government procurement operations are restricted to only a few terminal markets. Similarly, irrigation costs could be considerably reduced through improvements in the efficiency of the irrigation department. The funds so savedmay be used for improvingthe performanceof the organizations dealingwith agricultural research and extension for a proper and regular supply and enforcement of new technology.
Fourthly and finally, although the above measures promise low prices of agricultural commodities, the government should continue to guarantee minimum prices in agriculture to safeguard the interests of the farmers and consumers alike. Al. though the reduced prices of key agricultural inputs in relation to the current prices of agricultural commodities would ensure reasonable profit margins for agriculture, future increases in the prices of both inputs and outputs should strictly be based on cost-of-production studies.. In order not to impinge on farmers profit margins, increases in input prices should not be allowed to surpass the increase in agricultural commodity prices.
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